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ABSTRACT
Data centers have become critical resources for emergency
demand response (EDR). However, currently, data centers
typically participate in EDR by turning on backup (diesel)
generators, which are both expensive and environmentally
unfriendly. In this paper, we focus on “greening” demand
response in multi-tenant data centers by incentivizing ten-
ants’ load reduction and reducing on-site diesel generation.
Our proposed mechanism, ColoEDR, which is based on pa-
rameterized supply function mechanism, provides provably
near-optimal eﬃciency guarantees, both when tenants are
price-taking and when they are price-anticipating.
1. INTRODUCTION
Power-hungry data centers have been quickly expanding
in both number and scale. The ﬂexible energy usage of data
centers makes them promising candidates for demand re-
sponse, which is a crucial tool for improving grid reliability
and incorporating renewable energy into the power grid.
Emergency Demand Response (EDR) is the most widely-
adopted demand response program in the U.S., representing
87% of demand reduction capabilities across all reliability re-
gions. The U.S. EPA has identiﬁed data centers as critical
resources for EDR which was attested to by the following
example: on July 22, 2011, hundreds of data centers par-
ticipated in EDR by cutting their electricity usage before a
large-scale blackout would have occurred [5].
While data centers are increasingly contributing to EDR,
they typically participate by turning on their on-site backup
diesel generators, which are neither cost eﬀective nor envi-
ronmentally friendly. For example, in California (a major
data center market), a standby diesel generator often pro-
duces 50-60 times more nitrogen oxides (a smog-forming pol-
lutant) compared to a typical power plant for each kWh of
electricity, and diesel particulate represents the state’s most
signiﬁcant toxic air pollution problem [8].
Consequently, modulating server energy for green EDR
has received an increasing amount of attention in recent
years. For example, a recent ﬁeld study by LNBL has demon-
strated that data centers can reduce energy consumption by
10-25% for demand response (by, e.g., turning oﬀ unused
servers and/or migrating workloads to other sites), without
noticeably impacting normal operation [2].
While existing studies on data center demand response
show promising progress [4, 9], they are primarily focused
on owner-operated data centers (e.g., Google) whose opera-
tors have full control over both servers and facilities. In this
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paper, we focus on another type of data centers — multi-
tenant colocation data centers (e.g., Equinix). In a colo-
cation data center (simply called “colo”), multiple tenants
deploy and keep full control of their own physical servers in
a shared space, while the colo operator only provides facil-
ity support (e.g., power and cooling). Colos are much less
studied than owner-operated data centers, but they are ac-
tually very common, consuming nearly 40% of total energy
by data centers [6].
In addition, unlike many mega-scale owner-operated data
centers built in rural areas, colos are mostly located in metro-
politan areas, where EDR is most needed. For all these
reasons, colos are key participants in EDR programs.
Greening EDR in multi-tenant data centers, however, re-
lies on reducing server energy from tenants which may not
have incentives to do so, thus raising the research question:
how can a colo operator eﬃciently incentivize its tenants’
load shedding for EDR?1
Overview of results. This abstract presents a sum-
mary on our proposed mechanism, ColoEDR, based on sup-
ply function bidding to “green” colocation demand response
by incentivizing load reduction from tenants instead of fully
relying on backup diesel generation [1].
To our best knowledge, this paper represents the ﬁrst at-
tempt to design a supply function bidding mechanism for
colocation demand response. Our approach builds on, and
also adds to, the supply function literature. Furthermore,
we show that ColoEDR suﬀers little performance loss com-
pared to the socially optimal outcome, both when tenants
are price-taking and when they are price-anticipating.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A common type of demand response program is manda-
tory EDR: participants typically sign contracts with a load
serving entity (LSE) in advance (e.g., 3 years ahead in PJM
[7]) and receive ﬁnancial rebates for their committed load
reduction even if no EDR signals are triggered, whereas non-
compliance (i.e., failure to cut load as required during EDR)
incurs heavy penalty [7].
When the operator receives an EDR signal from the LSE,
it has two options for satisfying the load reduction. First,
without involving the tenants, the colo operator can use the
on-site backup diesel generator. We denote the amount of
energy reduction using diesel generation by y and the cost
per kWh of diesel generation (e.g., for fuels) by α.
Alternatively, the colo operator could try to extract IT
energy reductions from the tenants. We consider a setting
1
Tenants are ineligible to participate in EDR program since they
receive UPS-protected power from colo operator and are not directly
connected to the grid.
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where there are N tenants, i ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. When
shedding energy consumption, a tenant i will incur some
costs and we denote the cost from shedding si by a func-
tion ci(si). These costs could be due to wear-and-tear, per-
formance degradation, workload shifting, etc. We make a
standard assumption that the cost functions are continuous,
convex, and strictly increasing.
We introduce a simple and practical mechanism ColoEDR
below, and then discuss it in detail in the text that follows.
1. The colo operator receives an EDR reduction target
δ and broadcasts to tenants a parameterized supply
function S(·, p) according to
S(bn, p) = δ − bn
p
. (1)
where p is oﬀered reward for each kWh of energy re-
duction and bn is the bidding values that can be chosen
by tenant n.
2. Participating tenants respond by placing their bids bn;
3. The colo operator decides the amount of on-site gener-
ation y and market clearing price p. Given any y, the
market clearing price has to satisfy ΣnS(p(b), bn) +
y = δ,2 and thus
p(b, y) =
∑
n bn
(N − 1)δ + y . (2)
To determine the amount of local generation y, the
operator minimizes the cost of the two load-reduction
options, i.e.,
y = argmin
0≤y≤δ
(δ − y) · p(b, y) + αy. (3)
4. EDR is exercised. ∀n ∈ N , tenant n sheds S(bn, p),
and receives pS(bn, p) reward.
There are several advantages of ColoEDR from an opera-
tion point of view. First, bidding for the tenants is simple –
they only need to communicate one number, and it is already
common practice for operators to communicate with tenants
before EDR events, so the overhead is marginal. Second,
the colo operator collects just enough information (i.e., how
much energy reduction each tenant will contribute to EDR),
while tenants’ private cost function is masked by the form of
the supply function and hence not solicited. Third, ColoEDR
guarantees that the colo operator will not incur a higher cost
than the case where only diesel generator is used. Further,
ColoEDR pays a uniform price to all participating tenants
and hence ensures fairness.
Our mechanism is most related to [3], which considers an
inelastic demand δ that must be satisﬁed via N suppliers us-
ing supply function mechanism and proves eﬃcient bounds
on the resulting equilibrium. In contrast, our work assumes
that the market operator has an outside option (diesel) that
can be used to satisfy the inelastic demand. This leads
to a multistage game between the tenants and the proﬁt-
maximizing operator, a dynamic that has not been studied
previously in the supply function literature.
VCG-based mechanisms can be considered as natural al-
ternatives to our approach. While these mechanisms are
truthful, they violate all the four properties discussed above.
Under such approaches, tenants must submit complex bids
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For ease of presentation, we assume the power usage eﬃciency
(PUE) to be 1 here. Otherwise, one can simply scale y, α and δ
with PUE accordingly.
revealing their true costs; payment made to tenants may be
unbounded, and prices to tenants are diﬀerentiated, raising
unfairness issues.
3. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF ColoEDR
To evaluate the eﬃciency of ColoEDR, we use the (socially)
optimal outcome as a benchmark. This outcome relies on
the operator having full knowledge of tenants’ costs and full
control over tenants’ energy reduction, and tries to minimize
the social cost by solving the following problem.
SCM : min αy +
∑
i∈N
ci(si) (4a)
s.t. y +
∑
i∈N
si = δ (4b)
si ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , y ≥ 0. (4c)
The objective in SCM can be interpreted as the tenants’
cost plus the colo operator’s cost. Note that the internal
payment transfer between the colo operator and tenants can-
cels, and does not impact the social cost. Also, the Lagrange
multiplier of (4b) can be interpreted as the social optimal
price p∗, i.e., given this price as reward for energy reduction,
each tenant will individually reduce their energy by sn that
corresponds to the social cost minimization solution in (4).
3.1 Price-Taking Tenants
When tenants are price-taking, they maximize their net
utility, which is the diﬀerence between the payment they
receive and the cost of energy reduction, given by:
Pn(bn, p) = pSn(bn, p)− cn(Sn(bn, p))
= pδ − bn − cn
(
δ − bn
p
)
.
Here, the price-taking assumption implies that the variable
p is considered to be as is. It normally holds when mar-
ket consists of many players of similar sizes, who each has
little power to impact the market clearing price. The mar-
ket equilibrium for price-taking tenants is thus deﬁned as
follows.
Definition 1. A triple (b, p, y) is a (price-taking) mar-
ket equilibrium if Pn(bn; p) ≥ Pn(b¯n; p) ∀n ∈ N , b¯n ≥ 0,
and market is cleared by setting the price p according to (2),
and the amount of on-site generation is decided by (3).
The key to our analysis is a complete characterization
of the market equilibrium as the solution of an optimiza-
tion problem below. This characterization leads to eﬃciency
bounds for ColoEDR in Table 1.
Theorem 1. When tenants are price-taking, there is a
unique market equilibrium (bt, pt, yt) for ColoEDR, and the
resulting allocation (st, yt) can be characterized by the opti-
mal solution of the following problem
min
s,y
∑
n
cn(sn) +
α
2Nδ
(y + (N − 1)δ)2
s.t.
∑
n
sn = δ − y,
sn ≥ 0, ∀n, y ≥ 0.
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3.2 Price-Anticipating Tenants
In contrast to the price-taking model, price-anticipating
tenants realize that they can change the market price by
their bids, and adjust their bids accordingly. In particular,
they realize that the local generation and market price are
set by (2) and (3), and by ﬁrst order optimality,
y(b) =
√
(Σnbn)Nδ
α
− (N − 1)δ; p(b) =
√
(Σnbn)α
Nδ
. (5)
The price-anticipating model is suitable when the market
consists of a few dominant players, who have signiﬁcant
power to impact the market price through their bids, i.e.,
the oligopoly setting.
Given bids from the other tenants b−n, each price-anticipating
tenant n optimizes the following cost over bidding value bn
Qn(bn;b−n) = p(b)Sn(bn, p)− cn(Sn(bn, p))
Thus, substituting (1) and (5), we have
Qn(bn;b−n) =
√
(Σnbn)αδ
N
−bn−cn
(
δ − bn√
Σmbm
√
Nδ
α
)
.
The price-anticipating equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Definition 2. A triple (b, p, y) is a (price-anticipating)
market equilibrium if Qn(bn;b−n) ≥ Qn(b¯n;b−n) ∀n ∈ N ,
b¯n ≥ 0, the market is cleared by setting the price p according
to (2) and the amount of on-site generation is decided by
(3).
Similar to the price-taking case, we again show that there ex-
ists a unique equilibrium and, furthermore, that the tenants
and operator behave in equilibrium as if they were solving
an optimization problem of the same form as the aggregate
cost minimization (4), but with “modiﬁed” cost functions.
Theorem 2. When tenants are price-anticipating, there
is a unique equilibrium (ba, pa, ya) for ColoEDR, and the re-
sulting allocation (sa, ya) can be characterized by the optimal
solution to the following optimization:
min
∑
n
cˆn(sn) +
α
2Nδ
(y + (N − 1)δ)2
s.t.
∑
n
sn = δ − y
sn ≥ 0, ∀n, y ≥ 0,
where, for sn ≥ 0,
cˆn(sn) =
1
2
(
cn(sn) + sn
α
2N
)
+
1
2
∫ sn
0
√(
∂+cn(z)
∂z
− α
2N
)2
+ 2
∂+cn(z)
∂z
zα
Nδ
dz,
and for sn < 0, cˆn(sn) = 0.
Although the form of cˆn(sn) looks complicated, there is a
simple linear approximation that gives useful intuition.
Lemma 3. For all modiﬁed cost cˆn, n ∈ 1, . . . , N , for any
0 ≤ sn ≤ δ, cn(sn) ≤ cˆn(sn) ≤ cn(sn) + sn α2N .
The form of Lemma 3 shows that the diﬀerence between
the modiﬁed cost function and the true cost diminishes as
N increases, and this is the key observation that underlies
our subsequent results upper bounding the eﬃciency loss of
ColoEDR.
3.3 Discussion
With the characterization of the equilibria in Theorem
1 and 2, we can now bound the eﬃciency of ColoEDR. The
main results for the price-taking and price-anticipating anal-
yses are summarized in Table 1 and 2, where price ratio
compares the market price, colo saving compares operator’s
cost of EDR, and welfare loss compares the social cost of
market equilibrium with the optimal allocation. In Table
2, price markup is the increase in price when tenants are
price-anticipating compared to when they are price-taking.
Tenants Price Ratio Colo Saving Welfare Loss
Price-taking [N−1
N
, 1] [0, αδ/N ] [0, αδ/2N ]
Price-anticipating [N−1
N
, 1] [0, αδ/N ] [0, αδ/N ]
Table 1: Performance guarantee of ColoEDR com-
pared to the social optimal allocation.
Price Markup Extra Diesel Colo Saving
[0, α/2N ] [0, δ/2] [−αδ/N, 0]
Table 2: Comparison of price-anticipating against
price-taking equilibria of ColoEDR.
To summarize the results in Table 1 and 2 brieﬂy, note ﬁrst
that ColoEDR always beneﬁts the operator, since the colo
saving is always non-negative compared to the diesel-only
method. Second, regardless of tenants being price-taking or
price-anticipating, ColoEDR is approximately socially cost-
minimizing as the number of tenants grows. Third, ColoEDR
also gives tenants approximately social optimal payment,
since both the operator’s additional beneﬁt and welfare loss
are bounded by αδ/N . The loss in payment for tenants
compared to the social optimum is at most 2αδ/N , which
approaches 0 as N grows. Lastly, Table 2 shows that while
price-anticipating tenants drive up the market price and in-
crease the cost of the operator, ColoEDR is robust against
this behavior and the loss approaches 0 as N grows. Further,
it also highlights that it is possible for price-anticipating
tenants to cause the operator to use more diesel generation,
though our case study [1] shows that this is very unlikely to
occur in practice.
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